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Shaping Water Policy: Political 
Influences in the European Union and 
United States
Christopher Young
INTRODUCTION
Water is not a commercial product like any other but, rather, a heritage, which must be 
protected, defended and treated as such (Paragraph 1 of the preamble of the Water 
Framework Directive).
Water is the most basic resource for the sustenance of human life, and even though 
70% of the earth is covered in it, only one quarter of one percent is available to meet the 
needs of the earth’s ever-growing population. To secure sufficient quality and quantity of this 
vital resource for future generations, governments and international institutions around the 
globe will have to develop water policies to protect it. During the development of such poli-
cies, coalitions of economic interests compete with environmental interests to shape policy 
outcomes. The Clean Water Act and the Water Framework Directive are the United States 
and European Union’s most comprehensive water policies to date and serve as excellent case 
studies for understanding the political influences that affect such policies. 
Both policies developed out of a growing concern for human health and environmen-
tal degradation. They established quality standards, enabled public participation, and devolved 
the implementation and enforcement to the state or regional level. However, the political in-
fluences that have helped shape each law have led to vastly different implementation and en-
forcement strategies with varying mechanisms for federal oversight and public participation. 
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, known as the Clean Water 
Act (CWA), established national Water Quality Standards (WQS), Total Maximum Daily 
Loads (TMDL), a system of permits for maintaining WQS, and increased assistance for mu-
nicipal sewage treatment plants through the Construction Grants Program. It set two specific 
goals: to eliminate discharges of pollutants into the nation’s navigable waters by 1985; and to 
achieve water quality standards, which enabled the protection and propagation of fish, shell-
fish, and wildlife, as well as, preserved it for recreational use. The act called for progressively 
more stringent, technology-based standards to reduce and eventually eliminate discharges 
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of pollutants by municipalities and industries. It also enabled more public involvement by 
establishing public comment periods and public hearings, and also giving citizens the ability 
to bring violators to court. 
Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 
establishing a framework for community action in the field of water policy otherwise known as, the 
Water Framework Directive (WFD), institutes a legal framework for the protection and 
restoration of all European waters. By recognizing that water is not static and incorporating 
surface water, groundwater, coastal waters and estuaries into one piece of legislation, the 
WFD has created a whole new approach to European Union1 (EU) water policy. The WFD 
repealed out of date directives, integrated effective policies within one administrative frame-
work, and addressed issues not dealt with before under EU law such as quantity, droughts 
and floods. As such, the WFD is an innovative and ambitious reformation to European water 
policy (See European Parliament 1996; European Commission 1996 and 1997; Grant et al., 
2000; and Kallis & Butler, 2001). 
Both the WFD and the CWA shift the decision-making authority from the federal 
or supranational level towards the regional level (Foster, 2002; Whitford, 2007; Lubell et al., 
2002). This shift is called devolution or decentralization2. It is a move away from the tradi-
tional “command and control” approach. Foster describes the traditional approach as a “top 
down, national uniform standard,” whereby important policy decisions are made without 
public input, and the administrative agency making those decisions then “announce and de-
fend” those decisions to the public (Foster, 2002). Decentralization promises many improve-
ments over the traditional consultative nature of regulatory policy. Devolved institutions 
promise to engender civic participation by stakeholders directly affected by policy outcomes, 
create democratic legitimacy in which all parties’ needs are considered and deliberated, and 
move the range of expertise away from national technocrats to local communities that are 
closest to the situation (Kenney, McAllister, Caile, & Peckham, 2000; Foster, 2002). Devolu-
tion, or decentralization, is not without its critics who would argue that states are incapable 
of consistent implementation, are vulnerable to regulatory capture, and do little more than 
create symbolic policies (Lubell, 2004a; Dunlap & Mertig, 1992; Kuehn, 1995; Flatt, 1997; 
Steinzor, 2000; Sigman, 2009; Sigman, 2005). 
To understand who is involved in the policy process and what strategies they utilize in 
order to achieve their policy goals, I will turn to the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF). 
Sabatier et al. have argued that actors from varying public and private institutions or organi-
zations who share a “set of normative and causal beliefs” work together in order to achieve 
a common goal (Sabatier & Pelkey, 1987; Sabatier, 1988; Sabatier et al., 2005). Advocacy 
coalitions attempt to change policy by influencing multiple governmental institutions over 
time through various instruments, resources, or venues including litigation, direct political 
influence, research, monitoring, and public engagement campaigns. The influence of these 
coalitions is evident in both the CWA and the WFD. 
Through the lens of the ACF (Sabatier & Pelkey, 1987; Sabatier, 1988), I will analyze 
1 The European Union was called the European Community until the Maastricht treaty of 1993, under which, the 
title was officially changed. Since this paper extends over that time but focuses on the present, I will always refer 
to it as the EU.
2 Devolution and decentralization have become interchangeable in the literature and for this papers purposes will 
be defined as the shift of decision making and enforcement authority from the federal (U.S.) or supranational (EU) 
level to the regional level.
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stakeholder participation throughout the conception, drafting, adoption, and implementa-
tion phases of the CWA and the WFD policy cycle (Grant et al., 2000; Rosenbaum, 2002). 
I hypothesize that advocacy coalitions have shaped the creation, implementation and en-
forcement of both of these policies and that devolution has increased the availability of 
resources, strategies and venues. This paper will be structured into four sections. Following 
this introduction I will review the relevant literature, outlining the ACF, both sides of the 
decentralization debate, and one type of institution, which resulted from devolution, the 
watershed partnership. The literature review will be followed by a brief introduction to the 
policy making process to understand how policy is created in the EU and the U.S. In the 
subsequent section, I will conduct a stakeholder analysis using the ACF during each phase of 
the CWA’s and WFD’s policy cycle. In the final section, I will discuss my findings within the 
context of the proposed hypothesis.
ANALYZING WATER POLICY IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
The Advocacy Coalition Framework
The Advocacy Coalition Framework, as developed by Sabatier and Pelkey (1987), is a 
model for analyzing stakeholder behavior and public policy outcomes throughout the life 
cycle of a given policy. The ACF has three basic principles: that the most useful unit for 
analysis is the policy subsystem, consisting of a coalition of actors from a broad spectrum of 
organizations and institutions; that subsystem actors are driven by a set of shared normative 
or causal beliefs about problem causation and desired policy outcomes; and that ‘policy ori-
ented learning’ is a result of internal and external changes, happens suddenly or over time, 
and as such, policy processes should be studied over a decade or more (Sabatier, 1988). 
The ACF moves beyond the traditional notion of the “iron triangle,” consisting of 
interest groups, administrative bodies, and legislative committees. Instead, Sabatier et al. con-
sider coalitions as a multitude of actors involved at various levels of government, from public 
and private institutions, who play important roles in formulating, disseminating, and evaluat-
ing policy ideas (Sabatier & Pelkey, 1987; Sabatier, 1988). The ACF defines this subsystem 
of actors as the most useful unit of analysis and has explicit assumptions regarding whom to 
include, individual beliefs, individual motives to form coalitions, available resources, and the 
factors necessary to produce policy changes (Weible, 2006). These subsystems adopt strate-
gies utilizing one or more instruments in order to achieve their goals (Sabatier, 1988). Instru-
ments, or venues, used to affect policy change include litigation, direct political influence, 
research, monitoring, public opinion, public mobilization campaigns, financial resources, and 
skillful leadership such as policy entrepreneurs (Weible, 2006).
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TABLE 1: ACF Three Tiered Belief System
Type of Belief Resistance to 
Change
Entrenchment Example
Fundamental core 
beliefs
Very resistant Span multiple 
subsystems
Political Ideology
Policy core beliefs Resistant Subsystem wide Effectiveness of 
policy instruments
Secondary beliefs Most susceptible Relate to area 
within a subsystem
Budgetary 
allocations
Source: (Weible, 2006, p. 99; Sabatier, 1988, p. 145)
Table 1 describes the three-tiered hierarchical belief system identified in the ACF. The 
three tiers consist of fundamental core beliefs on top, followed by policy core beliefs second, 
and secondary beliefs on the bottom (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). Fundamental core 
beliefs are those that are least likely to change over time and span multiple subsystems, such 
as political conservatism or liberalism. Because these beliefs are unlikely to change over the 
life of a policy, they can be generalized. Policy core beliefs are subject to change based on 
new information or external events, but because they are shared throughout the subsystem, 
and much more deeply rooted than secondary beliefs, they are highly resistant to change. 
Individuals tend to filter or ignore information or events that challenge their policy core 
beliefs but readily accept information that reinforces them (Weible, 2006). Sabatier and Jen-
kins-Smith (1999) identify eleven categories of policy core beliefs, the three most relevant 
to this paper being: the perception of the severity and causes of a problem; value priorities; 
and the effectiveness of policy instruments. Secondary beliefs are the most likely to change in 
response to new information or events and are relevant to an area within a subsystem, such 
as budgetary allocations (Weible, 2006). 
Internal and external events can change policy core beliefs. Examples include: changes 
in socioeconomic conditions, such as the loss or gain of a source of funding; changes in 
public opinion about the policy issue; changes in systemic governing systems, such as the loss 
or gain of a policy entrepreneur; or the influence of other, opposing, subsystems (Sabateir & 
Jenkins-Smith, 1999). When an external event happens, and the subsystem reacts by chang-
ing their secondary or policy beliefs, then they are engaged in what Sabatier et al. refer to as 
‘policy-oriented learning.’ 
“Policy-oriented learning refers to relatively enduring alterations of thought or 
behavioral intentions which result from experience and which are concerned 
with the attainment (or revision) of policy objectives” (Sabatier, 1988). 
Specifically, coalitions choose available instruments or venues to affect desirable policy 
changes and then learn from the outcomes of their efforts. Policy oriented learning can hap-
pen suddenly, such as when a court rules in the opposing coalition’s favor and the subsystem 
is forced to alter their strategies, or it can happen gradually, such as when research or access 
to new information can sway public opinion over time. 
Examples of policy-oriented learning can be seen in the European Union and the 
United States. In the EU, environmental groups rarely use litigation through the European 
Christopher Young Pitzer College138
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2011/iss1/12
Claremont–UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union
Court of Justice because they have found it to be extremely difficult and unproductive 
(Hoornbeek, 2004). In the U.S. litigation is a primary tool. However, environmental groups 
generally conduct a cost benefit analysis when deciding which violators to pursue since legal 
action has proven expensive and time consuming (Naysnerski & Tietenberg, 1992).
According to Sabatier et al., “policy-oriented learning,” policy analysis, and the com-
pletion of a full policy cycle influence subsystem actions or reactions over time. Therefore, 
subsystems must be analyzed over a period of a decade or more. Sabatier (1988) defines 
policy analysis as “the cumulative effect of findings from different studies and from ordinary 
knowledge,” which influences the perceptions of policy makers over time. For example, this 
can be seen in the U.S. when considering the establishment of Total Maximum Daily Loads 
for chemicals and toxins in water bodies and the long list of chemical research that preceded 
such policies (Hawken, 2007). Furthermore, a decade or more of analysis is needed to com-
plete at least one formulation, implementation, and reformulation cycle of any given policy 
and to acquire an accurate portrait of a policy’s successes and failures (Sabatier, 1988).
The formulation, implementation and reformulation of a policy can be called a policy 
cycle. The policy cycle is conceptualized in various ways. Grant and his colleagues view the 
policy cycle as a ‘policy loop’ when they apply it to European environmental policy. Their 
loop consists of policy conception, the drafting of legislation, formal adoption, and imple-
mentation and enforcement (Grant et al., 2000). Literature regarding U.S. policy processes 
applies a different set of terms to the same cycle. Rosenbaum (2000) refers to the policy in 
six phases: agenda setting, formulation and legitimation, implementation, assessment, refor-
mulation, and finally termination. However, these two approaches are symbiotic. 
Agenda setting is described as getting issues on legislative calendars, before legisla-
tive committees, or on the president’s agenda (Rosenbaum, 2002). In broad terms, policy 
conception is agenda setting, the tools for both concepts are the same: public mobilization, 
scientific research, and direct political influence. Rosenbaum amalgamates formulation with 
legitimation. Formulation is equivalent to the drafting phase of Grant’s loop, whereas le-
gitimation is the same as Grant’s adoption phase. The implementation phases are identical; 
however, Rosenbaum adds the assessment and reformulation phase along with a termination 
phase to his process. For Grant, the policy loop starts over – assessment and reformulation 
are inherent.
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GRAPH 1: Grant’s Policy ‘Loop’ (headings) Integrated with Rosenbaum’s Policy Process (bullets)
Graph 1 shows the overlap between Grant’s policy loop and Rosenbaum’s policy 
process. By observing policy subsystems and the policy oriented learning that takes place 
throughout the entire policy loop, levels of public participation and access can be analyzed. 
Within the Clean Water Act and the Water Framework Directive public participation varies 
at each phase. There tends to be more room made for public input and direct participation 
during the conception and implementation phases. Likewise, due to the technical nature of 
the drafting and adoption phases, access is generally limited to political elites and to organiza-
tions with more economic or scientific resources or political “know how” (Kaika, 2003; van 
Overveld et al., 2010; Richardson, 1994).
Stakeholder Analysis
Stakeholder analysis is defined by Varvasovszky and Brugha as “a tool or set of tools 
for generating knowledge about actors – individuals and organizations – so as to understand 
their behaviour [sic], intentions, interrelations and interests; and for assessing the influence 
and resources they bring to bear on decision-making or implementation processes.” Ac-
cording to Weible (2006) most stakeholder analyses address a similar set of questions: Who 
are the stakeholders? What are their interest and beliefs? Who controls what resources? With 
whom do stakeholders form coalitions? And what strategies or venues do stakeholders use 
to achieve their goals? 
Stakeholder analysis is a useful tool for understanding advocacy coalition’s beliefs and 
motives. However, to conduct a stakeholder analysis of the CWA and the WFD much more 
information is needed than is available. A quantifiable stakeholder analysis requires the ana-
lyst to identify and collect data directly from stakeholders (Varvasovszky & Brugha, 2000). 
Data collection methods include in-person interviews, semi-structured interviews, self-ad-
ministered questionnaires, or some combination thereof. Only through data collection from 
actual stakeholders can many of these questions be answered with confidence. As that level 
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of analysis is outside the scope of this paper, I will attempt to answer the who, with whom, 
and what resources, strategies, or venues questions through primary and secondary sources 
but will only be able to speculate about stakeholder beliefs and motives based on generaliza-
tions in existing literature.
Within the environmental policy arena, policy is formed and reformed through the 
efforts of conflicting coalitions representing either environmental interests or economic in-
terests (Schlager, 1995). While this is a very broad generalization of much more complex 
subsystems, it is useful to understand their overall policy goals in order to envisage their 
underlying policy core beliefs. In general, ‘environmental interests’ promote stronger en-
vironmental policies, while ‘economic interests’ work to prevent or remove environmental 
policies, which may cause economic hardship (Hays, 1982; 2000). 
Environmental interests share a general set of causal beliefs centered on human health, 
the aesthetic value of nature, and ecological stability (Hays, 2000). Environmental interests 
are coalitions of governmental and non-governmental organizations along with members 
of the public and private sector, whose primary concerns are environmental, consumer, and 
health protection. Examples of members would include the Sierra Club, Green Peace, the 
World Wildlife Fund, the U.S.EPA, The European Commission’s DG XI, or The United Na-
tions Environment Programme (Hays, 1982; Grant et al., 2000). 
Economic interests oppose environmental regulation based on two sets of deeply root-
ed values: the defense of traditional manufacturing or agricultural methodologies; and con-
temporary free market values (Hays, 2000). They view regulation as a threat to traditional 
norms or to economic development and free enterprise. The economic interest coalition is 
comprised primarily of business interests such as ‘food giants’, agribusiness, the pest control 
industry, the chemical industry, the USDA, the European Federation of National Associations 
of Water and Wastewater Services (EUREAU), along with deregulation, free-market politi-
cians such as Reagan, Bush, Thatcher and their administrations (Richardson, 1994; Kaika, 
2003; Grant et al., 2000; Hays, 2000).
In regards to the WFD, European actors involved in promoting environmental policy 
include institutional actors, such as the European Commission’s DG XI (Directorate General 
for the Environment) and the European Parliament’s Environmental Committee, along with 
environmental and consumer interest groups. The anti-regulation coalition is comprised 
primarily of political elites within the Council of Ministers and the European Commis-
sion’s DG VI (Directorate General of Agriculture) along with agricultural, water supply, and 
chemical interests (Richardson, 1994; Kaika, 2003; Grant et al., 2000). 
Institutional actors advocating for environmental regulation in the U.S. have consisted 
primarily of Democratic senators and presidents, although many republican politicians in the 
pre-Reagan years could be included. These political elites coalesce with environmental and 
consumer protection organizations such as the Nature Conservancy, the Wilderness Alliance, 
and the Sierra Club (Hays, 1982). Anti-regulation coalitions consist of ‘food giants’, the pest 
control industry, agribusiness, the chemical industry, and the USDA. During the Reagan 
years, the Reagan administration and large portions the Republican Party joined these ef-
forts (Hays, 1982; Hawken, 2007). 
The Environmental Era and the Move toward Decentralization
As the environmental movement has unfolded, coalitions of economic interests, op-
posed to environmental regulation, have successfully diminished federal capacity to enforce 
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environmental regulations (Hays, 1982; Whitford, 2007). Such was the case during the Rea-
gan administration when he severely cut the EPA’s budget and appointed Anne Gorsuch as 
its Director in 1981. She effectively curtailed environmental regulations through administra-
tive reviews, budgetary restrictions, and staff changes (Dunlap & Mertig, 1992). Meanwhile, 
environmental interests have become generally dissatisfied with the regulatory inflexibility, 
unequal distribution of environmental hazards, and the traditional “announce and defend” 
practices of the federal bureaucracy (Foster, 2002; Whitford, 2007; Lubell et al., 2002; Lubell, 
2004a). Both groups have pushed for the devolution of the decision-making authority from 
the federal (U.S.) or supranational (EU) level towards the regional level. 
Devolution can be viewed as a move away from traditional “command and control” 
policies of the federal government towards local authorities. The traditional top down ap-
proach has been criticized for being inefficient, technocratic, piecemeal, dislocated, and lack-
ing democratic legitimacy (Sabatier et al., 2005; Foster, 2002; Lubell et al., 2002). Advocates 
for devolution argue that it is more democratic and engenders civic participation. In addi-
tion, it moves the range of expertise away from national technocrats to local communities 
that are closest to, and most familiar with, the situation and therefore most able to choose 
appropriate responses (Foster, 2002; Lubell et al., 2002; Whitford, 2007). 
Devolution goes by many names, including: collaborative management institutions and 
watershed partnerships (Foster, 2002; Lubell, 2004a; Lubell et al., 2002; Kenney et al., 2000). 
Collaborative management institutions form in two ways: there are “ad hoc”, or local groups, 
that form on their own; and there are community advisory committees that develop out of 
formal arrangements generally overseen and initiated by a regulatory agency. Ad hoc institu-
tions attempt to resolve conflicts between various stakeholders and find practical, cost-effec-
tive and economically salient solutions to watershed problems while overcoming administra-
tive “red tape” consistent with traditional regulation. Community advisory committees, or 
“working groups,” are set up by statutory or regulatory mandate and typically bring together 
public and private interests to resolve issues related to the placement of environmentally 
hazardous facilities or the cleanup and reuse of contaminated lands (Foster, 2002). 
Devolution, or decentralization, is not without its critics (Flatt, 1997; Steinzor, 2000; 
Sigman, 2009; Sigman, 2005; Kuehn, 1995; Prud’homme, 1995). One argument against de-
volving authority to the state level is that states are incapable of consistent implementation 
of environmental policy. Flatt suggests that the quantity of states in the U.S. that have author-
ity over their National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit program 
(37) is “too large for the EPA to monitor and police effectively” (Flatt, 1997). There is also 
concern over state willingness to enforce strict environmental laws, when economic incen-
tives for the state induce lower standards (Flatt, 1997; Steinzor, 2000). For instance, states that 
want to attract economic investments may refrain from enforcing environmental policies and 
pass pollution problems onto “downstream” states. Furthermore, if downstream states have 
stricter laws, their efforts are undermined and dis-incentivized. This practice can leads to a 
“race to the bottom” in environmental enforcement (Sigman, 2009; Sigman, 2005; Steinzor, 
2000; Kuehn, 1995). 
Two other arguments against devolved institutions include the preservation of markets 
and the threat of regulatory capture. International institutions such as the EU have tradition-
ally been concerned with the use of environmental regulations as de facto trade barriers 
(Aubin & Varone, 2004). Regulatory capture is when well-resourced interests overwhelm 
state agencies’ enforcement capacity with technical and legal resources or political influence 
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in order to steer environmental policy in a direction that benefits them (Flynn, 2000; Kuehn, 
1995).
Collaborative Watershed Partnerships
Collaborative watershed partnerships have emerged as part of the move toward de-
volved public policy and created one of the most vital and valuable means for public partici-
pation (Lubell & Leach, 2005). They tend to be more grassroots, or ad hoc, rather than gov-
ernment appointed institutions (Lubell, 2004b; Sabatier et al., 2005; Foster, 2002). Sabatier et 
al. (2005) define watershed partnerships as: 
[R]elatively informal organizations involving a wide variety of governmental and 
non-governmental stakeholders seeking to develop a management plan for the 
watershed and then implementing it through specific restoration projects, changes 
in land use practices, water quality regulations, and other ways. Partnerships are 
intended to be rather long-term affairs (five to ten years).
As decentralized institutions, watershed partnerships promise to be beneficial for both 
environmental and economic interests; either addressing issues outside the scope of the cen-
tralized government for environmental concerns or adopting flexible policies that cater to 
economic interests. Watershed partnerships tend to develop where there are more non-point 
source polluters and tend not to develop when there is more government enforcement 
(Lubell et al., 2002). It is important to point out that these organizations do not work in lieu 
of the government, but rather they work with the government to continue regulation efforts 
(Lubell et al., 2002). 
Like decentralization in general, watershed partnerships are not without their critics. In 
one study, Mark Lubell, sought to examine the effectiveness of watershed partnerships. He 
compared two competing efficacy frameworks: The political contracting framework, which 
views collaborative institutions as venues for political decision making processes where 
stakeholders seek mutually agreeable policies (Ostrom, 1990; Lubell et al., 2002); and the 
symbolic policies framework, where partnerships do not produce tangible results but rather 
symbolic policies that do little more than suppress potential political threats (Lubell, 2004a). 
The political contracting framework suggests that there would be consensus and cooperation 
between members of the coalition, whereas the symbolic policies framework suggests high 
levels of perceived consensus but little or no cooperation or follow-through. Lubell analyzed 
the U.S. EPA’s National Estuary Program3 and compared stakeholder perceptions between 
NEP participating estuaries and non-participating estuaries. Through a survey of various 
stakeholders he assessed the level of perceived consensus and the level of behavioral coopera-
tion. The author found that there were indeed high levels of consensus but little cooperation 
3 “EPA’s National Estuary Program was established by Congress in 1987 to improve the quality of estuaries of 
national importance. The Clean Water Act Section 320 directs EPA to develop plans for attaining or maintaining 
water quality in an estuary. This includes protection of public water supplies and the protection and propagation of 
a balanced, indigenous population of shellfish, fish, and wildlife, and allows recreational activities, in and on water, 
requires that control of point and nonpoint sources of pollution to supplement existing controls of pollution. In 
several cases, more than one State is participating in a National Estuary Program. Each program establishes a Com-
prehensive Conservation and Management Plan to meet the goals of Section 320.” -http://water.epa.gov/type/
oceb/nep/index.cfm
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(Lubell, 2004a). While decisions reached by consensus are more likely to be complied with 
by those involved in the decision making process (Foster, 2002), Lubell’s study indicates that 
there is room for concern considering the effectiveness of watershed partnerships to actually 
achieve their desired results (Lubell, 2004a).
TABLE 2
Section Description
Two approaches to public policy A comparison of the EU and U.S. political systems 
and their policy making apparatuses 
Policy Conception A historical look at both policies and what placed 
them on the political agenda
Drafting Legislation Investigates the political influences that shaped the 
draft bills
Adoption Political maneuvering that shaped the final language 
of each statute.
Implementation and enforcement The implementation and enforcement strategies of 
each statute 
Devolution How each statute incorporates public participation
As outlined in Table 2, in this section I will briefly compare the political systems of the 
U.S. and the EU followed by a stakeholder analysis of the CWA and the WFD with what 
data is available. I will utilize the policy cycle or ‘loop’ as outlined by Grant et al. (2000) in 
an attempt to identify: who is involved in the coalitions; with whom they coalesce; and what 
resources, strategies, or venues they utilize to achieve their goals during each phase of the 
policy cycle.
Two approaches to public policy 
The EU and U.S. governmental structures are fairly similar with small variances in 
the responsibility of each institution. The three main institutions of the EU consist of the 
Council of the European Union (the ‘Council’), the European Commission (the ‘Commis-
sion’), the European Parliament (the ‘Parliament’) and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
(European Union, 2011a). The U.S. federal government consists of the Presidency, the Sen-
ate, the House of Representatives, and the Supreme Court. These institutions are known the 
executive, legislative, and judicial branches. The bureaucracy is sometimes considered the 
fourth branch although its agencies fall under the executive branch (Van Horn et al., 2001). 
The Council is the seat of the European President and most similar to the executive 
branch, however its role in the legislative process is more similar to that of the U.S. Senate. 
The Parliament is the body most similar to the House or Representatives. Like the Senate 
and the House, the Council represents the member states equally, whereas the Parliament 
represents the member states proportionately. Also similar to the Senate and the House, on 
most topics, these two institutions must agree on the final language of a directive in order to 
make legislation in the European Union. 
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The Council is made up of the Heads of State (HOS)4 from each member state. Within 
the Council, the Heads of State appoint ministers who represent their country in the various 
meetings. The Heads of State only meet twice a year to address larger issues, such as the Euro 
debt crisis, whereas the ministers meet much more frequently to deal with smaller issues. 
For example, the minister of the interior from each member state will meet to discuss issues 
of immigration several times a year. The Council can only make decisions with consensus. 
If they can reach consensus on a given issue, they will adopt a ‘resolution’ that either estab-
lishes a common position or asks the Commission to draft a specific piece of legislation. 
Resolutions are formal documents that state an official position and can be legally binding 
(European Union, 2011a). 
The Parliament currently has 736 members from the 27 EU countries. The Members 
of the Parliament (MEPs) are voted into office directly by the EU citizens every 5 years. The 
Parliament makes decisions during what is called a ‘plenary session’ which is a meeting of all 
726 MEPs in Strasbourg, France. This happens every month and lasts one week. The rest of 
the time the parliament is preparing for these sessions. The Parliament cannot initiate new 
policies, however, it can forward draft proposals for legislation to the Commission or ask for 
new legislation to be drafted. (European Union, 2011b). 
The Commission is the bureaucratic branch of the European government. Much like 
the U.S. bureaucracy, Commissioners are appointed by the Council to head various ad-
ministrative agencies. However, appointments must be approved by the Parliament. In the 
U.S. context, the administrators of the various administrative agencies are appointed by the 
President and confirmed by the Senate. EU Commissioners typically hold political positions 
within their member state prior to coming to the commission but are sworn to work in the 
best interests of the EU rather than their nation after they take office. Appointments happen 
every five years within six months of the Parliamentary elections. 
All new legislation begins in the Commission. Legislation is drafted in consultation 
with various stakeholders, technical experts, the Council, the Parliament, or one of the vari-
ous autonomous committees who represent different public or private interests. The Com-
mission also conducts technical analysis and drafts scientific reports with the help of outside 
consultation (van Overveld et al., 2010). Once a proposal is drafted, a ‘communication’ is 
adopted and goes to the Parliament and the Council for further debate and approval (Euro-
pean Union, 2008). Typically, legislation is only adopted if the Parliament and the Council 
can agree upon a final version through a co-decision procedure that consists of up to three 
readings, recommendations for amendments, and the possible formation of a conciliation 
committee. However, it is important to note that the co-decision process does not apply to 
all areas of legislation. The Council, for example, can take decisions on agriculture, economic 
policy, visas and immigration alone in consultation with the Parliament.
The legislative process in the U.S. is fairly similar. Legislation is initiated in the Con-
gress. Members of Congress, their staff, or interests groups can draft federal bills, however, 
only a member of either chamber can introduce a bill into the legislature. Once a bill is 
introduced it is assigned to one or more committees, and from there, possibly into subcom-
mittees. It is in the committees and subcommittees where bills are amended and committee 
hearings are held. If a bill is voted out of all of its assigned committees, it goes to the floor 
of that chamber for debate by all members. On the floor, it is amended further and then 
4 The Heads of State of Government are commonly referred to as simply the ‘Heads of State’ or HOS
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voted on by all members. If it passes one chamber, it is introduced into the other chamber 
for similar action. If two identical bills pass both houses, the president receives the bill for 
signature or veto. If both houses pass similar but varying bills, each version is debated in a 
conference committee where the two bills are merged into one. From there, a conference 
report is created and each chamber must vote to approve the changes. If both chambers ap-
prove the conference report the final bill then goes to the president for a signature or veto. If 
the President signs a bill it becomes law. If it is vetoed, the legislature can override that veto 
with a 2/3 vote in both the House and the Senate, making it law (Van Horn et al., 2001). 
Policy Conception
Policy conception, or agenda setting, can be initiated either by policy elites in a ‘top-
down’ manner or by the public in a ‘bottom up,’ sometimes called ‘grassroots,’ manner (Van 
Horn et al., 2001). The CWA and the WFD can be seen as being initiated from the bottom-
up. To fully understand the evolution of the WFD and the CWA, including the coalitions 
that placed these policies on the agenda, we must look at the history of environmental policy 
in general. The coalitions that were instrumental in the passage of these two policies were 
also part of the larger environmental movement and saw water as only one piece of a larger 
movement. 
The development of the WFD and the CWA were influenced by a growth of envi-
ronmental lobbies as well as an emergent awareness within the international community 
of the environmental degradation caused by human actions (Bär & Kraemer, 1998; Hays, 
1982; Hawken, 2007; Davis, 1998). The first Earth Day in April of 1970 and the first world 
environmental summit in Stockholm, 1972, were two major international demonstrations 
of public concern for the environment, and many would say the beginning of the modern 
environmental movement. But, while these events influenced the development of environ-
mental policies in both polities, their paths to policy conception varied.
EU development of environmental policy can be divided into three waves (European 
Commission, 1997; Kallis & Butler, 2001). During the first wave, from 1973 until 1986, 
environmental policies were primarily concerned with the protection of public health and 
the protection of market liberalization. Following Stockholm, at the Paris Summit of the 
European Heads of States of Governments, the HOS agreed to include policies on the en-
vironment within EU legislation resulting in the First Environmental Action Programme 
(European Communities, 1972). Also at this time, pressure was building within the Union: 
the development of international environmental treaties between member states was viewed 
as potential trade barriers. In part, the decision to enact laws at the European level was made 
in order to maintain economic harmonization (Aubin & Varone, 2004). 
The foundation for the WFD was first laid in the First Environmental Action Pro-
gramme (EAP) of 1973 (Aubin & Varone, 2004). The first EAP proposed defining environ-
mental quality objectives and led to research into pollution causes and problems (Hey, 2005). 
This innovative policy led to the formation of several water policies but only proved to 
be somewhat effective. They were criticized greatly for being cumbersome and ineffective. 
However, one thing these policies did do was create political clout for the European Union 
in the area of environmental policy (Kallis & Butler, 2001). In a 1996 report, the European 
Commission reviewed each of the policies formed during this wave and proposed to either 
eliminate them or integrate them into the WFD (European Commission, 1996).
The second wave, from 1988 until 1992, introduced two new directives, which ad-
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dressed point source pollution from urban wastewater5 and non-point source pollution from 
agricultural run-off6. This wave of environmental policy focused on environmental protec-
tion and pollution control through environmental objectives and emission limits. The inte-
grated use of environmental objectives and emission value limits was a different approach 
from the first wave of environmental policy, which focused primarily on environmental 
objectives. The Commission had advocated for the amalgamation of these two regulatory 
approaches, reasoning that a combined approach enabled local flexibility in implementation 
while also allowing for the protection of more sensitive aquatic environments (European 
Commission, 1996). 
During the second wave, in June of 1988, the Council began laying the groundwork 
for the WFD when they asked the Commission to submit a proposal to improve the ecologi-
cal quality in the Community’s waters. In 1991, the declaration of the Ministerial Seminar 
on groundwater, a body of the Council, called for a “programme of actions” aiming at 
“sustainable management and protection of freshwater resources.” Again, in 1992, and later 
in 1995, the Council requested revisions to existing groundwater and pollution policies “as 
part of an overall policy on freshwater protection” (European Parliament and Council, 2000).
The third wave of environmental regulation was marked by the adoption of the 5th 
Environment Action Programme of 1993 and includes the subsequent development and 
implementation of the WFD. Policies focused on sustainable development, integrated man-
agement and subsidiarity7 (Kallis & Butler, 2001). Part of the 5th Action Programme was to 
assess the state of the European environment (European Commission, 1992). In 1995, the 
Council and the Environment Committee of the European Parliament called for a “funda-
mental review of Community water policy.” In November of that same year, the European 
Environment Agency produced its report “Environment in the European Union – 1995” 
in which it found a need for action to protect Community waters in both qualitative and 
quantitative terms (European Parliament and Council, 2000). The next month, December of 
1995, the Council adopted a resolution that required the Commission to draft a proposal for 
a new Directive on sustainable water policy.
The Commission did carry out a fundamental review in 1995 and found a need for 
a new Water Resource Framework Directive. In their 1996 communication, the Commis-
sion notes that previous EU water policy had been divided for administrative purposes into 
various categories such as surface water, ground water, marine water, rivers, lakes, estuaries, 
etc., and acknowledged that water does not “recognize such distinctions.” This assertion is 
the basic principle driving the development of the WFD that either replaces existing EU 
water policy or integrates it within a single framework (European Commission, 1996). The 
1996, communication was the beginning of the negotiations between the Commission, the 
Parliament, the Council, and the various stakeholders who assisted in drafting this legislation. 
While the U.S. CWA was adopted around the same time as early EU water policies, 
the history of environmental activism and water protections dates back to the progressive era 
(Hays, 1982). The first legislation dealing with water specifically was the Rivers and Harbors 
Act (RHA) of 1899. The RHA included a provision in it known as the Refuse Act, which 
5 Council. (1991). Directive concerning urban waste water treatment (91/271/ EEC). Official Journal.
6 Council. (1991). Directive concerning protection of water against pollution by nitrates from agriculture (91/676/EEC). 
Official Journal.
7 Subsidiarity is the notion that, where possible, environmental regulation should be handled at the Member State 
level rather than the Community level.
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banned the discharge of pollutants into America’s navigable waters. However, until 1968, the 
Refuse Act was never enforced (Cronin & Kennedy, 1999). It was not until the 1948 Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) that the next piece of significant water legislation 
was passed. The FWPCA gave responsibility over preventing water pollution to the states and 
focused on point sources8 of pollution like industrial waste or municipal sewage (Migliaccio 
et al., 2011). 
Samuel Hays (1982) views WWII as the historical dividing point between the con-
servation movement and the environmental movement. After the war, American prosperity 
increased as did their education and access to information, which brought about a new 
kind of awareness to environmental issues. With an increase in income, and an increase in 
interstate highways, more Americans had access to the outdoors (Davis, 1998). People soon 
became concerned about the natural environment for its aesthetic value. The loss of nature as 
a recreational and aesthetic resource was viewed as a threat to one’s quality of life (Dunlap & 
Mertig, 1992). Environmental groups such as the Nature Conservancy, World Wildlife Fund, 
Friends of the Earth, Environmental Defense Fund, Natural Resources Defense Council, and 
Greenpeace formed during this period and pushed for stronger national pollution controls 
(Davis, 1998).
The National Pollution Control Act of 1955 was adopted as smog became noticeable 
in cities like Los Angeles and Pittsburg and after reports that 4,000 people had died in Lon-
don due to heavy smog (Davis, 1998). The Water Quality Act of 1965 focused on interstate 
water quality at the same time the use of chemicals was increasing and having visibly nega-
tive effects on the environment and human health. Large fish die offs in the Mississippi, the 
fire on the Cuyahoga River, and the release of Rachel Carson’s book Silent Spring brought 
national attention to environmental degradation from human actions (Hays, 1982; Davis, 
1998). All of this culminated into 20 million Americans celebrating the first annual Earth 
Day on April 22, 1970 (Dunlap & Mertig, 1992). 
At that time, the federal government was actively pursuing environmental policies. 
President Nixon signed the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and established 
the EPA in 1970 following the 1969 Santa Barbara oil spill (Clarke & Hemphill, 2002). The 
EPA, once established, began enforcing the Refuse Act of 1899 (Davis, 1998). Seeing a need 
for a complete overhaul of the 1948 FWPCA, Senator Edmund Muskie (D-ME), an envi-
ronmentalist, chair of the public works committee, and a presidential hopeful, began drafting 
amendments to the FWPCA in April of 1970 (Houck, 2002). 
As can be seen in this brief history of environmental policy conception, there are dis-
tinct advocacy coalitions in the EU and the U.S. In the EU, coalitions included members 
from the Environment Committee of the Parliament, the European Environment Agency, 
the Commission’s DG XI, environmental NGOs, and the general public. The venues they 
utilized include research and monitoring (e.g., EEA), public engagement campaigns (e.g., 
environmental NGOs), Direct Political Lobbying (e.g., environmental NGOs), and Inter-
national Institutions (e.g., the Stockholm Summit). In the U.S., environmental coalitions 
include the general public, members of the Senate, the President, environmental NGOs, and 
the newly formed EPA. They used research (e.g., Rachel Carson), monitoring (e.g., EPA), 
direct political lobbying (e.g., NGOs), and policy entrepreneurship (e.g., Senator Edmund 
8 Point pollution comes from a singular source such as a discharge pipe from a sewage treatment plant or industrial 
factory. Contamination levels can typically be measured. Non-point pollution comes from diffuse sources such as 
farms, mines, or urban areas. Measuring contamination and identifying sources tends to be difficult.
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Muskie and President Richard Nixon) to achieve their policy goals. 
Drafting Legislation
Drafting the WFD took place over several years with the consultation of the Council, 
the Parliament, the European Environment Agency, stakeholders, and scientific bodies. In 
February of 1996, the Commission adopted the Communication from the Commission to the 
Council and the European Parliament: European Community Water Policy (COM (96) 59 final) 
in response to the various requests from the other European institutions (European Com-
mission, 1996). This communication evaluated previous water policies, defined objectives 
for a new policy framework, and gave recommendations for future action. The Parliament, 
the Council, the Committee of the Regions, and the Economic and Social Committee re-
sponded to this communication that same year (European Parliament and Council, 2000)9.  
In 1997, the Commission published its first draft proposal of the Framework Directive 
on water policy, which outlined four main objectives: the provision of drinking water; the 
provision of water for other economic purposes; the protection of the environment; and the 
alleviation of the impacts of floods and droughts. It addressed the means by which the objec-
tives should be met including the achievement of “good” chemical and ecological status and 
the completion of a River Basin Management Plan in consultation with the public (Euro-
pean Commission, 1997). Three main points were contested the most during the drafting 
phase: the cessation of hazardous substances; the implementation of full cost pricing, where 
users pay for all costs associated with clean water; and the time allowed for implementation, 
(Kaika, 2003).
The Commission relies heavily on the use of experts to draft policies based on scientific 
analysis, however, since the Commission relies on outside experts for technical assistance, 
lobbying the drafting phase of legislation is considered to be highly effective (Kaika, 2003; 
European Commission, 2001). This is evident when one considers that the final directive 
maintains most of the original objectives outlined in the original 1997 proposal (Bouwen, 
2002; van Overveld et al., 2010). To obtain the technical information and draft their proposal, 
the Commission invited various stakeholder and interest groups to a two-day conference on 
European water policy. According to the Commission, some 250 delegates from the public 
and private sectors participated in the conference and at least 30 stakeholders responded in 
writing regarding the proposed framework (European Commission, 1997).
The dissemination of information on environmental issues to the general public is 
guaranteed through European law (European Commission, 1990). While this enables all EU 
citizens access to the decision making process, in reality, organizations with more resources 
and “know how” have an advantage over other, less powerful entities or individual citizens 
(Kaika, 2003; van Overveld et al., 2010; Richardson, 1994). Factors influencing access in-
clude: resources dedicated to lobbying efforts, location of organizations’ headquarters, and 
whether or not the Commission asks an organization for their input. In addition to the 
Commission’s open call for participation in the 1996 conference, they specifically invited a 
select group of organizations that included: water suppliers, chemical and agricultural indus-
tries, agricultural and farmers unions, environmental NGOs, and private water companies. 
Although the Commission actively solicited participation from specific parties, it cannot  be 
accused of “bias” when the variety of interests, economic and environmental, is taken into 
9 October 23, July 25, September 19, and September 26, respectively
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account. Additionally, the Commission claims to have carefully considered suggestions from 
all stakeholders who participated (Kaika, 2003).
The drafting phase in the U.S. is quite similar to that of the EU. The drafting of sen-
ate bill 2770, the 1972 Amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, (S2770) began 
as early as April of 1970. By the beginning of 1971, a prototype existed and went into eight 
days of committee hearings. In the House, the initial markup of their bill did not begin until 
November of 1971, after the senate bill had already passed. The main dispute of the bill was 
whether or not the federal government should establish effluent limits or continue to rely 
on water quality standards. 
The water quality standards approach establishes general standards that must be met but 
gives the states flexibility in determining how to achieve those goals. The emission limits ap-
proach defines permissible levels of pollutants allowed in any body of water (Houck, 2002). 
Economic interests, along with state Governors, state water quality managers, municipal 
dischargers, and members of the Nixon Administration attended the committee hearings 
and pushed for continued implementation of water quality standards by the states. They saw 
WQS as sufficient and viewed the emission limits approach as an encroachment on states’ 
rights. Those pushing for effluent limits included Senator Muskie, along with environmental 
interests such as Clean Water Action10 (Houck, 2002; Dunlap, 1992). The senate criticized state 
water quality standards as being “weak, late, widely disparate, scientifically doubtful, largely 
unenforced and probably unenforceable” (Houck, 2002). S2770, which focused on effluent 
emission limits, the use of Best Available Technologies (BAT), and excluded water quality 
standards, passed by a vote of 89-0: an unusually high level of bipartisan cooperation (Rosen-
thal & Poole, 2000; Houck, 2002). 
The House version of the bill did not include emission limits but rather, focused on 
maintaining the state water quality standards. House Bill 11896, A Bill to Amend the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act (HR11896), passed by a vote of 380-14 after amendments to in-
clude BAT, emission permits, and making polluters pay for treatment, were introduced and 
voted down. Amendments that were approved included one that allowed public hearings 
for employees who lose their job as a result of a company moving to meet effluent limits 
and another that preserved the rights of states to control discharges from vessels (Rosenthal 
& Poole, 2000). Once both legislatures passed their versions of the FWPCA amendments, 
S2770 and HR11896 went into a conference committee where the bills were debated, ne-
gotiated and amalgamated. 
Access to the drafting phase by environmental coalitions is quite similar in both polities. 
In the EU, the process is very open as the Commission invites organizations for consultation. 
During committee hearing in the U.S., the House and the Senate will similarly invite inter-
ested parties in for consultation. Because the WFD is a much newer policy, information on 
who attended the consultations exists. However, for the U.S. this information is much more 
difficult to come by. In the EU environmental coalition members include the EEA, scientists 
hired by the Commission and the Parliament, the general public, the Environment Commit-
tee of the Parliament, the Commission’s DG XI, and international Environmental NGO’s. 
They used monitoring, research and direct political lobbying to achieve their policy goals. 
10 David Zwick, founder of Clean Water Action, claims responsibility for getting the Clean Water Act passed. Clean 
Water Action. (n.d.). About Us. Retrieved March 13, 2011, from Clean Water Action: http://www.cleanwateraction.
org/about Nader for President 2008. (2008). Ralph nader’s Achievements. Retrieved March 13, 2011, from Nader for 
President 2008: http://www.votenader.org/about/achievements/
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Members of the environmental coalition in the U.S. included Senator Muskie, the general 
public through public opinion, and environmental groups. The only venues that were avail-
able during this phase were direct political lobbying and policy entrepreneurship. 
Adoption
Adoption is the phase of the policy cycle where the bill goes from being a proposed 
law into an enforceable one. As outlined earlier, in the European Union, once a proposal is 
drafted by the Commission, it goes to the European Parliament and Council for further de-
bate and approval; a co-decision procedure takes place resulting in the possible formation of 
a conciliation committee; and if agreement is found, a final version is adopted as legislation. 
The adoption process in the US is similar. If the House and Senate bills vary, these legislative 
bodies debate their two versions in a conciliation committee. However, unlike the EU, if a 
bill makes it out of congress, the President must either sign or veto it and if it is vetoed, it can 
only be overridden with a 2/3 vote in both houses – then it is adopted as law. 
The adoption process for the WFD lasted from February of 1997 until June of 2000 
(European Parliament and Council, 2000). The typical duration of this phase is one to two 
years (van Overveld et al., 2010). However, negotiations between the Commission, the Par-
liament and the Council took almost four years because of political maneuvering and dis-
agreements between the Parliament and the Council. The Parliament refused to read the 
Commission’s proposal until after changes to the decision making process enabled by the 
Amsterdam Treaty came into effect on May 1, 1999. 
The Amsterdam Treaty established a co-decision process between the Parliament and 
the Council, giving the Parliament equal power to the Council in the passage of legislation. 
Prior to this date the Parliament could only make recommendations to the Council, which 
could, under most circumstances, dismiss those recommendations (Bär & Kraemer, 1998). 
The Parliament believed that if it moved forward with the WFD prior to May 1, 1999 that 
it would be a weaker directive, with less enforcement or oversight, than the directives it re-
pealed (Kaika, 2003). The Council favors local interests, less Community level oversight and 
maintaining state sovereignty. The positions of the Council and the Parliament are evident 
in the amendments proposed by each body during negotiations. For example, when it came 
to priority hazardous substances, the Parliament wanted to fully incorporate the OSPAR 
Treaty11, which would end all discharges of hazardous waste into European waters by 2020. 
The Council wanted to abandon the zero emission standards all together. There was also 
strong disagreement on issues ranging from full cost pricing to the length of the implemen-
tation period, where the council wanted to extend it to 34 years and the Parliament’s wanted 
to reduce it to ten years (Kaika, 2003). It was not until after a third reading and intensive last 
hour negotiations that a compromise was finally reached. The Plenary Session of the Euro-
pean Parliament adopted the final text in September of 2000 and the WFD came into effect 
on December 22, 2000.
During negotiations various interest groups lobbied the Commission, the Parliament, 
11 “The OSPAR Convention is the current legal instrument guiding international cooperation on the protection 
of the marine environment of the North-East Atlantic. Work under the Convention is managed by the OSPAR 
Commission, made up of representatives of the Governments of 15 Contracting Parties and the European Com-
mission, representing the European Union.” As quoted from the OSPAR website: www.OSPAR.org. The name 
comes from the amalgamation of two previous conventions where their goals and standards were established: the 
Oslo Convention and the Paris Convention. (OSPAR Commission, 2011)
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and the Council (Richardson, 1994; van Overveld et al., 2010; Kaika, 2003). In fact, during 
the final negotiations, environmental NGOs organized meetings and discussions between 
the Council and Parliament in hopes of getting an agreement without compromising en-
vironmental protection (Kaika, 2003). The final version of the WFD is clearly a melding of 
environmental and economic interests. The result is a piece of legislation that is open for 
interpretation and has limited Community oversight (Kallis & Butler, 2001; Kaika, 2003).
The adoption of the CWA was relatively simple in comparison to the WFD. Once both 
chambers passed their versions of the bill, it went into conciliation committee. Once there, 
the debate centered on state water quality standards versus effluent limits and the required 
use of BAT. The House bill had requirements and standards for water quality, limits on total 
maximum daily loads for polluted waters, and an implementation plan. The Senate would 
not yield on the requirement of BAT but in order to compromise, kept the water quality 
standards and total maximum daily loads from the House bill. Not seeing the usefulness for 
TMDLs or WQS, Senator Muskie, who authored the Senate bill and chaired the Public 
Works Committee that passed it, told the EPA to “assign secondary priority” to the House 
measure (Houck, 2002). 
Once the bills were reconciled, the committee report passed both houses and the bill 
went to the President for his signature. President Nixon vetoed the bill and it went back to 
the House and the Senate where it passed by votes of 247-23 and 52-12 respectively and 
became law; one of only two presidential vetoes overridden by the 92nd congress (Rosenthal 
& Poole, 2000).
Although the adoption phase is brief, it is highly politically charged. In the EU, the 
Parliament, the Commission and environmental groups pursued their policy goals through 
direct political lobbying. In the U.S., the only member of the environmental coalition with 
significant influence is the policy entrepreneur, Senator Muskie. 
Implementation and Enforcement
The implementation and enforcement stage is the most complex for both the WFD 
and the CWA. Implementation of the WFD began on December 22, 2000. Once it came 
into effect, member states had to begin implementing the new directive within binding 
deadlines. The first deadline was the transposition, or integration, of the WFD into national 
law by each member state by December 22, 2003. Competent authorities and river basins 
had to be identified by June 22, 2004. A detailed analysis of river basin districts, including 
human impact on surface and ground waters, as well as an economic assessment of water use 
was due by March 22, 2005. Monitoring programs had to be operational by December 22, 
2006 and reported to the Commission by March 22, 2007. Agreements on significant water 
management issues within River Basin Districts (RBD) and draft River basin Management 
Plans (RBMP) were to be drawn up by December 22, 2008. The public was to be consulted 
for 6 months and a final RBMP should have been submitted by December 22, 2009. The 
WFD stipulates that the final RBMP shall be reassessed in 2012 and that “good” chemical 
and ecological status is to be achieved in all European waters by 2015 (European Parliament 
and Council, 2000). 
Implementation and enforcement are the sole responsibility of the member states. The 
WFD does not define any implementation strategy; however, the Commission recognized 
the challenges of implementing the WFD and adopted the Common Implementation Strat-
egy (CIS) in May of 2001. The CIS is a non-legally binding document that aims “to allow, 
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as far as possible, a coherent and harmonious implementation of the framework directive” 
(European Commission, 2001). The CIS suggests strategies for everything from information 
sharing to monitoring programs and public involvement but the final implementation ap-
proach is up to the competent authority within each river basin. The European Commis-
sion only maintains oversight through the review of reports provided by member states and 
RBMP but has little enforcement authority. The only recourse the Commission has is the 
complicated processes outlined in Article 169 of the Treaty, which allows for consultations, 
informal warnings, formal opinions, and eventual legal action through the ECJ (Hoornbeek, 
2004). The Commission can bring actions for failure to implement or enforce any EU laws 
before the ECJ and the courts can impose fines for non-compliance (Grant et al., 2000). 
Actual implementation of the WFD at the national level has varied tremendously. For 
instance, member states have to classify water bodies ecological status as either high, good, 
moderate, poor, or bad, and can get exemptions for those classified as ‘artificial water bodies’ 
(man-made) or ‘heavily modified water bodies’ (canals for shipping, etc.). Denmark designat-
ed water bodies according to the best achievable status, whereas the Netherlands designates 
them based on their current condition (Keessen et al., 2010). These different approaches have 
very dissimilar consequences in the long-term with Denmark striving for higher standards 
than the Netherlands. 
U.S. policy has been being implemented for 40 years and has yet to meet its goal of 
ending all pollution into the nation’s waters, originally set for 1985. The Clean Water Act 
consists of ten major programs: the establishment of water quality standards (WQS), anti-
degradation policies, waterbody monitoring and assessment, reports on condition of the 
nation’s waters, total maximum daily loads (TMDL), National Pollution Discharge Elimina-
tion System (NPDES), section 319 for non-point pollution, section 404 for wetlands and 
other waters, section 401 state water quality certification, and the state revolving loan fund 
(SRF) (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2011). The first thing that happens in the 
implementation of the CWA is the establishment of WQS by the EPA or state authority. If 
those are met within a given waterbody, then anti-degradation policies go into effect, which 
require monitoring by the EPA or the designated state authority. If WQS are not met then 
a strategy for meeting them is designed that typically includes the establishment of TMDLs. 
TMDLs establish permissible amounts of pollution and various polluters can receive permits 
through either the NPDES program for point source polluters, section 319 for non-point 
polluters, section 404 if it has to do with wetlands, section 401 if it is the federal government, 
or through the SRF which provides funding to municipalities for updated sewage treatment 
facilities (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2011). All of these programs are supposed 
to work together to ensure WQS can be met within all inter and intra-state waters.
Implementation and enforcement is shared between the federal bureaucracy and the 
states. Many of the responsibilities of the EPA have been devolved to state level branches 
such as the Department of Environmental Conservation in New York, the California State 
Water Quality Control Board, or the Arkansas Department of Environmental Quality. Since 
the EPA permits states to carry out their own implementation and enforcement, it maintains 
influence through the issuance or revocation of authorizing agreements, or through the ad-
ministration of various federal grants programs. The EPA has the authority to intervene and 
enforce the CWA through its own administrative body or the federal courts, should a state 
fail to meet its obligations. Furthermore, the CWA enables citizen suits, allowing environ-
mental groups to act as de facto monitoring and enforcement agents. (Hoornbeek, 2004). 
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Federal enforcement mechanisms in the implementation and enforcement phase have 
allowed advocacy coalitions in the U.S. more venues to meet their policy objectives than 
the previous two phases. Members of the general public, the international community, the 
U.S. EPA, and a vast number of environmental groups can be considered members of the 
environmental coalition. They utilize such venues as research, monitoring, litigation, public 
engagement campaigns, direct political lobbying, and collective action institutions such as 
watershed partnerships to achieve their policy goals. In the EU, coalitions have broadened as 
well. They include the EEA, the general public, the international community, the Commis-
sion’s DG XI, and international environmental organizations. They utilize research, moni-
toring, public engagement campaigns, direct political lobbying and public consultation to 
achieve their policy goals.
Devolution 
The WFD and the CWA shift the decision-making authority from the federal or supra-
national level towards the regional level. The principle of subsidiarity, the notion that envi-
ronmental regulation should be handled at the lowest level of government, pushed for by the 
Council, ensured that the implementation and enforcement authority remained within the 
member states (Kallis & Butler, 2001). As a result, oversight and enforcement at the Commu-
nity level is relatively small, especially in comparison to that of the U.S. While the EPA can 
authorize states to carry out their own implementation and enforcement, the CWA assigns 
a much stronger federal role.
The WFD requires public consultation and stakeholder notification in the process of 
developing and drafting the final RBMP. The CIS encourages inviting NGOs and stake-
holders with a “specific expertise” for consultative purposes (European Commission, 2001). 
The fact that the CIS goes so far as to recommend the inclusion of groups with a specific 
expertise, encourages consultation with organizations that will be regulated by the final 
RBMP. This exercise raises concern over the potential for ‘regulatory capture.’ While the 
Commission was able to maintain some objectivity when drafting the WFD in consultation 
with various interests, it is unclear if local authorities will be able to do the same. The Com-
mission is a much larger institution that regularly consults with special interests while many 
of the competent authorities are new organizations with much smaller budgets and staffs. 
The WFD requires that the competent authorities make the draft River Basin Manage-
ment Plans public and invite stakeholders to comment for a period of six months. However, 
because no common implementation strategy exists, this also is left up to both – each mem-
ber state and each region within that member state. A quick survey conducted of the Rhine 
river basin found that each country conducted this process differently: in France, a general 
survey was released to the public; in Germany each region was responsible for holding public 
hearings and collect the relevant data; in Austria an online survey was released that asked 
people whether or not they agreed with specific statements but did not ask for comments; 
and no data could be found for the Netherlands, Switzerland, or Luxembourg. How the 
public is involved in changes from region to region, state to state, and basin to basin. While 
well-organized economic interests are much more likely to know how to make their opin-
ion known, the general public may not be as well informed about how they can participate.
The Clean Water Act encourages stakeholder participation throughout the enforcement 
and permitting processes. The issuance of a pollution permit requires that a public notice be 
released within 15 days of a permit application completion, followed by a 15-30 day com-
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ment period. During the comment period the public is invited to offer comments or con-
cerns about the permit in question. The issuing agency, as well as any other interested party, 
then reviews the permit and the comments. Concerned citizens can then request a public 
hearing to facilitate further discussion. If a permit is issued then a Statement of Findings, 
along with the conditions of the permit, is made available to the public (U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency, 1990). This information allows for citizens to monitor the activities of 
the permitted company or developer. If citizen monitors find that the permit holder is not 
adhering to the conditions of the permit then they have the right to take that company or 
developer to court. However, the citizen monitors must show sufficient “standing,” which is 
the ability of the individual or group bringing the suit to prove that they will be sufficiently 
affected or harmed by the law or action being challenged. (Naysnerski & Tietenberg, 1992)
Increased public participation is inherent in the WFD and the CWA; still, the mecha-
nisms that enable public participation vary. Membership in an environmental organization is 
almost requisite for participation. Without that, individuals must be vigilant to know when 
and where public hearings are to be held; they must know when a violation can or does oc-
cur; and they must be geographically savvy to know where violations may be occurring that 
can affect them. For example, Title IV, Section 401(a) (1) of the Clean Water Act states that, 
“Such State or interstate agency shall establish procedures for public notice in the case of 
all applications for certification by it and, to the extent it deems appropriate, procedures for 
public hearings in connection with specific applications” (The Senate and House of Repre-
sentatives of the United State of America, 2002). This leaves the responsibility and judgment 
for what is “appropriate” in each state’s hands. A polluter seeking a permit in an upstream 
region of a river basin may affect water quality for fishing and swimming 100 miles or more 
downstream; however, public notices are not required 100 miles downstream. 
Language barriers, community heterogeneity, technical knowledge, and income levels 
can all influence individual access to the policy process. For instance, the state of New York’s 
Department of Environmental Conservation, which administers the permit process for New 
York, has established that the public will be notified through the DEC’s weekly Environ-
mental Notice Bulletin and through a publication in a local newspaper where the permit is 
being issued (New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, 2010). However, 
a publication in a local paper does not necessarily inform all citizens that may be affected 
by the permit, since notices of public comment periods and hearings are traditionally dis-
seminated in English only. The NY DEC notes that “sometimes” notices will be published 
in foreign language papers (2010). Heterogeneity makes it harder to form effective coalitions 
by raising bargaining costs and decreasing consensus as compared to more homogeneous 
communities whose desires are relatively similar (Lubell et al., 2002).
Konisky (2009) and Imperial (1999) both found, in separate studies, that income cor-
relates directly to enforcement efforts and grant awards under the CWA. They found that 
lower income counties received less enforcement and funding. Additionally, according to 
Naysnerski and Tietenberg, private citizens must be aware of the exact language of a statute 
in order to determine if a violation has occurred and have the financial resources to cover 
the upfront costs of a lawsuit when legal action is necessary (Naysnerski & Tietenberg, 1992). 
Legal cases can take years, and reimbursement is only available after all appeals have been 
complete and only if they have successfully won the case. Furthermore, the burden of proof 
is left to the plaintiff. While individuals have access to monitoring reports they must also have 
some technical understanding of the materials in the reports to understand how the permit 
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may be in violation. In legal cases, specialists are often needed (Naysnerski & Tietenberg, 
1992). Money, time and expertise are thus necessities for pursuing legal action. 
DISCUSSION
The WFD and the CWA were initiated by public sentiment, drafted to include pub-
lic participation, and include devolved implementation and enforcement mechanisms that 
further encourage public involvement (Grant et al., 2000; Howarth, 2009). Coalitions of 
environmental interests have helped shape the creation, implementation and enforcement of 
both of these policies and their push for devolution has increased the availability of resources, 
strategies and venues. The environmental interests and venues, used in each policy, and dur-
ing each phase, can be seen in Table 3.
The environmental coalition subsystems in either polity have changed over the course 
of each policy’s cycle. In the early years, the EU coalition was broad and included members 
of Parliament, the Commission, the European Environment Agency (EEA), environmental 
NGOs, scientists, and members of the general public. During the drafting, adoption, and 
implementation phases many of these actors were present. However, during the implementa-
tion and enforcement phase the framework itself diminished some of their roles. For instance, 
the Commission, who was the biggest advocate for a strong environmental framework, is left 
with fewer oversight mechanisms or enforcement capabilities. Implementation and enforce-
ment at the member state level is left up to the competent authority that each state, or group 
of states within each river basin, chooses. 
The shift from federal policy making institutions to national policy making institutions 
alters the venues or resources that coalitions can use to obtain their policy goals. Political 
lobbying of the Commission and the Parliament were seen as being the most effective by 
organizations that had offices in Brussels and were therefore able to dedicate resources to 
lobbying (Kaika, 2003). Now these organizations will have to work in 110 river basins, all 
with potentially different implementation strategies and enforcement mechanisms. While 
they will still probably focus their efforts on Brussels, their capacity to affect change at the lo-
cal level will be diminished. Local chapters of these environmental groups or newly formed 
ad hoc groups will have to compete directly with economic interests within each river basin. 
In the U.S., the CWA developed, as public awareness to environmental degradation 
increased. Public sentiment was influenced by national disasters, research, such as that of 
Rachel Carson, and public engagement campaigns. In turn, the public influenced political 
actors and the policy agenda. In the years following the passage of the CWA, the coalitions 
and venues have changed. Republicans supported the CWA and environmental regulation 
in general prior to the deregulation, free market politics of the Reagan administration. Today, 
the party identification of the current president is the number one indicator of EPA enforce-
ment, with less enforcement under republican presidents than democrats (Whitford, 2007). 
The CWA opened the door for citizens to function as monitors and enforcers and 
utilize the federal courts to prosecute violators. Additionally, the EPA has moved to create 
devolved institutions such as watershed partnerships through programs like the National Es-
tuaries Program (Lubell, 2004a). Watershed partnerships allow for direct debate and coopera-
tion between actors in competing coalitions to achieve a policy outcome. This move toward 
devolved policy formulation and increased public participation is a general trend across both 
policies. However, it may not be as effective as it is intended to be.
Advocates for devolved regulation in Europe and the U.S. cite democratic legitimacy, 
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TABLE 3: Environmental coalitions and their resources during each policy phase of the 
Clean Water Act and the Water Framework Directive.
U.S. CWA EU WFD
Coalitions Venues Coalitions Venues
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U.S. Senate 
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U.S. Senate 
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transparency and greater responsiveness to local needs, while dissidents remain concerned 
about the harmonization of state laws and the willingness of states to meet minimal environ-
mental standards at the cost of national competitiveness (Howarth, 2009). Both sides of the 
argument are right. Since the WFD only defines a basis for action through environmental 
objectives, deadlines, and emission limits, but gives each competent authority the discretion 
to define the mechanisms of implementation, the results have been mixed. While regulatory 
flexibility under the WFD has garnered more public involvement and site-specific imple-
mentation strategies, it has also seen reluctance amongst member states to comply. In fact, 
only 17 of the 27 Member States published their draft RBMPs by the December of 2008 
deadline (Kampa et al., 2009). The CWA has also had mixed results when states consider 
economic consequences to stronger environmental regulation (Sigman, 2009; Sigman, 2005; 
Steinzor, 2000; Kuehn, 1995). For instance, Sigman (2004) finds that states that are autho-
rized to implement the CWA were less likely to enforce the statutes, resulting in a 4% in-
crease in degradation of water quality in downstream states.
CONCLUSION
The policy ‘loop’ is complex and multifaceted with various openings for interested 
parties to influence new policies. The conception phase was strongly influenced by early en-
vironmental groups, the failures of previous laws, and a growing concern over the protection 
of the environment and public health. The Commission and the Congress rely on outside 
experts and technical assistance through consultation, leaving well-positioned groups able to 
impact policy more effectively than less politically knowledgeable groups or individuals. The 
drafting and adoption phases of the WFD were wrought with political maneuvering. In the 
EU, the Parliament and the Council disagreed profusely during negotiations and reduced the 
final WFD to a weak compromise that is almost entirely left open for interpretation. Mean-
while, the Senate and the House could hardly agree on policy outcomes. 
Both laws are extremely ambiguous as a result of political compromise and leave more 
uncertainty in their implementation and enforcement phases. Although the WFD and the 
CWA require public participation, what is clear is that lobbies with more resources and 
know how have been able to play a more strategic role in both of these policies than the 
average citizen. And the inclusion of consultation with technical experts leaves competent 
authorities vulnerable to regulatory capture by local interests or political elites.
By recognizing that water is not static and incorporating surface water, groundwater, 
coastal waters and estuaries into one piece of legislation, the WFD has created a whole new 
approach to water policy. The patchwork of policies developed in the first two waves of 
European environmental policy adoption have been criticized for being ineffective, neglect-
ing certain areas while focusing heavily on others, or leaving some areas out altogether. This 
piecemeal policy process is comparable to existing U.S. water policy. By repealing out-of-
date laws, integrating effective policies within one statute, and addressing issues currently not 
dealt with under U.S. law such as quantity, droughts, and floods, the U.S. could innovatively 
and ambitiously reform American water policy. 
The CWA, along with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1970, the Safe Drink-
ing Water Act of 1974, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, the Clean Air 
Act of 1970, and the Endangered Species Act of 1973, have allowed the public to: request 
reports through freedom-of-information laws, review and comment on Environmental Im-
pact Statements, attend and participate in public hearings and comment periods, attend 
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hearing permit procedures, pursue litigation for violations, and call and report violations 
through various agencies. These powers, along with strong federal oversight and the abil-
ity for the EPA to enforce the CWA within any state that it deems necessary, have enabled 
environmental coalitions to be more active in the policy formation, implementation and 
enforcement processes. These are all highly effective tools that the WFD would benefit from 
adopting in future revisions. 
This analysis of stakeholder participation is important for understanding the impacts 
of political influence in policy systems such as the EU and the U.S. Both systems allow ac-
tors from governmental and non-governmental institutions to affect policies throughout 
the policy cycle. Implications for future research include an in-depth analysis of actors’ be-
liefs, motives, and coalition preferences within each subsystem. This would be possible only 
through a stakeholder analysis of actors and institutions in the U.S. and the EU, utilizing 
survey instruments following Weible (2006). In addition to understanding actors’ motives 
and beliefs, a stakeholder analysis would be beneficial in understanding the long-term effects 
of decentralization on public participation and policy effectiveness. 
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